They were used as stepping stones for the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia in early By late it was easy to foresee that the French Indochinese forces would turn against Japan and join the allied cause once the expected invasion began. The Viet Minh would now have to compete with the French for the favour of the Allies and seek to establish a position of strength that could be used to liberate Vietnam not just from Japan but also from French colonialism.
Les livres d'A. At any rate his statements from late , not just to Moffat but to others as well, are discomforting.
As happens often in history, what happened next was different from what everyone had thought. La solution de la coupure ne sera acceptable par les Vietnamiens [de Bao Dai — A. The French would soon see Giap as a hardliner, and kept looking for ways to create dissension among the Vietnamese leaders so Giap could be marginalized.
The Russian Revolution began as a city-based revolt and then became a civil war with armies moving against each other along the main axes of communication. Notice biographique sur M. Japan also anticipated an Allied invasion and therefore launched a coup against the French and disarmed them on 9 March , although no Allied invasion happened.
This had two contradictory effects on Giap and the Viet Minh.
Firstly, the sudden disappearance of the French administration removed both the army and the police that had oppressed the people. The Japanese had no capacity to take over the running of the country. Hence an opportunity was opened for rapidly expanding the Viet Minh movement throughout the Red River delta and also further beyond.
Another similar movement, the Vanguard Youth, spread out in southern Vietnam. These movements were greatly reinforced by communists and other leftists who were now released from French jails. When Japan surrendered on 15 August, city-based activists were thus able to utilize the power vacuum and seize power in a rapid and almost nonviolent revolution.
They were far away from the main action. Giap and other leaders had been assembled at a remote place called Tan Trao, with no means of communication with the people who seized power in the cities. Giap led his troops into a small and unnecessary confrontation with a Japanese force at Thai Nguyen but his brigades could actually march unhindered all the way to Hanoi.
Yet he faced serious difficulties. He had to avoid battle with a huge Chinese army, which entered Vietnam from the north in compliance with a decision by the Allies that China would occupy northern Indochina to disarm the Japanese there, while Britain would occupy the southern half. Giap also had to prepare his forces for resisting a French return.
The French made a quick comeback in the south, with British help, but did not land in the north until 6 March His forces were ready to resist the French invaders but it was essential to avoid a two-front struggle against the French and Chinese at the same time.
In the next period, Giap made a short and unsuccessful stint as negotiator, serving as deputy head and de facto leader of a Vietnamese delegation to negotiate with France at Dalat in the central highlands. No agreement was reached. Although this was mainly because of French recalcitrance, Giap was not as impressive as a diplomat as he was as a teacher and commander, so a more natural division of labour developed in the Viet Minh leadership afterwards, with Giap concentrating on military and police matters while Pham Van Dong, Hoang Huu Nam — and Ho Chi Minh himself — took care of diplomacy.
It would be a drawn-out war, a war for the survival of his forces.
That there would soon be full-scale war became more than likely when the French bombed and seized control of the port city Haiphong on 23 November. In this period, autumn , Giap made some cynical statements that have since been associated with his name and been repeated even in some of the obituaries in the international press.
And in the end France would give up. Ho Chi Minh used to say that it would be a war between a tiger and an elephant or between grasshoppers and elephants but Ho said this just allegorically. He did say directly that millions of people would have to die. Giap called a spade a spade and said it would not matter if thousands or millions died.
Keith P. Nye , Robert A. Socialistes au Parlement. When it did not, when the casualty figures just continued to increase beyond any reasonable breaking point and the enemy still continued to fight and even escalated the fighting, McNamara started to have doubts. Ferdinand Lacretelle —89 of Paris joined the Jesuits in , was missioned to China in , ordained in Shanghai , appointed superior of the Shanghai mission , expelled from China , and missioned to South Vietnam ; he established a Jesuit residence in Saigon in , a major seminary in Dalat in , and a novitiate in Thu Duc in ; he was master of novices —64; spiritual director and professor of canon law. Le tempo singulier des pratiques ordinaires de la mobilisation collective Marie-Laure Basilien-Gainche , Le juge communautaire et la loi nationale. Becker, Laurence C.
All the sacrifice needed to ensure national liberation was worth it. These were chilling words. Giap saw a need to convince his interlocutors that Vietnam would hold out no matter what; if he expressed any element of sorrow, fear or worry, then it might seem that he was not fully determined to fight until victory. Perhaps he was too honest or direct to express himself in less cynical terms. I sometimes seek comfort in the memory of having attended at some point in the early s a commemorative event for war veterans in the Museum of Revolution here in Hanoi.
He was not treated as the most important man in the room, but sat in the audience together with the rest of us, on the second row of chairs if I remember correctly. The kind of respect that the little man next to me showed for the war veterans in the room thoroughly impressed me.
I was especially impressed when two psychologically deranged former soldiers insisted to take over the podium from the designated speaker in order to read out some extremely long poems. Giap just sat there patiently listening to their ramblings. Sometimes I also think of the fact that my friend and colleague Duong Trung Quoc, one of the historians who worked with Giap on his memoirs in the s, never met his own father.
He was killed in late December , in the battle that Giap had initiated. Giap and I have quarrelled both orally and verbally over what happened in Hanoi on 19 December , the day the all-out war with France began. He claimed that a conscious decision was made to launch an attack as a way of taking the initiative and demonstrating a will to fight.
In my view, he was lured into a trap on 19 December by the local French authorities who feared that a new French government under the socialist Leon Blum would engage in new talks with Ho Chi Minh. The local French wanted war. They wished to place Blum before a fait accompli but could not take the initiative themselves for fear of being repudiated.
They thus wanted Giap to act first. I think he made a tremendous tactical mistake in launching his attack at the very moment when a new French government might repudiate the aggressive actions undertaken by its local representatives, who had been appointed by General de Gaulle. I think the outbreak of war was avoidable — at least at that point of time. Giap always maintained that the outbreak of war was inevitable. This allowed him to launch his first conventional battle at Cao Bang near the Chinese border in October , and to win a decisive victory.
The French had to evacuate the border region. Giap and his colleagues learned from these mistakes before launching a great campaign in late to surround and destroy a newly established French fortress at Dien Bien Phu, way up in the northwestern highlands near Laos. The battle of Dien Bien Phu is so well known that I will mostly bypass it here. Dien Bien Phu was one of the epic battles of the twentieth century, and one of those where an Asian force won against a Western one: Tsushima , Pearl Harbor , Singapore , Dien Bien Phu It depended on a massive mobilization of porters, on troops being willing to sacrifice themselves in attacks against heavily fortified positions, and on massive Chinese assistance.
Yet the outcome was not a given. The attackers were sometimes close to a physical and psychological breaking point, and the greatest contribution Giap made to victory was probably his decision to call off the final onslaught at a time when it had been decided but when victory was not yet certain, and continue to build strength for some more time before closing in on the French bastions. Vo Nguyen Giap remained minister of defence but had lost some of his power.
As Ho Chi Minh became older, and Secretary General Le Duan built up his discrete and uncharismatic power, a new generation of less colourful military officers took control of the army. General Nguyen Chi Thanh, not Giap, was the main brain behind the Tet offensive in , which may have resulted from a miscalculation on the part of Hanoi. Log In Sign Up. Conference Presentations. Save to Library Edit. Master's thesis. Exiled to London, Charles de Gaulle, between and , pushed to obtain the leadership of the resistant organisations and succeeded.
Results 1 - 16 of 49 Dictionnaire de la Grande Guerre (HISTOIRE) (French Edition) . France- Indochine: Un siècle de vie commune (Histoire) (French Edition). of 29 results for Livres: Histoire et Sciences humaines: Histoire . La conquête de l'Algérie: Les germes de la discorde (Blanche et rouge) (French Edition) France-Indochine: Un siècle de vie commune (Histoire) (French Edition).
Providing nuance and precision to the traditional political conception of the relationship between the French inland resistance and General de Gaulle, this detailed analysis thus offers a more in-depth and subtle comprehension of the phenomenon of resistance in France. Gildea, Robert. Fighters in the Shadows. Save to Library Download Edit. Poulain, Martine. Volunteering academic. Circulations, daily life, illegalities.